In 2015, legislation imposing a standardised packaging regime for
Introduction
In the United Kingdom, smoking kills over 100,000 people every year. Deaths from smoking are more numerous than the next six most common causes of preventable death combined. 1 At the same time, large numbers of young people continue to take up the habit. It is estimated that over 200,000 children between 11 and 15 begin smoking each year. response to this public health problem, a number of important tobacco control measures have been introduced. These include compulsory standardised packaging for tobacco products, required under the Standardised Packaging of Tobacco Products Regulations 2015 ("the Regulations"). 3 The Regulations came into force on 20 May 2016 and, with effect from 21 May 2017, require all cigarettes and hand-rolling tobacco to be sold in standardised packaging. The United Kingdom was the second country in the world (after Australia) to introduce such legislation. However, its progress onto the statute book was far from smooth. Tobacco companies fought the measure vigorously, both through the consultation process and in the courts.
This article focuses on the legal challenge brought against the Regulations by the tobacco industry. It had two prongs. In the first, which was ultimately referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union for a preliminary ruling in ( In this article, I aim to explain in detail the industry's objections to the United Kingdom's standardised packaging legislation in British American Tobacco and to outline the legal system's response to. This may, at first sight, appear a relatively modest goal. However, the range and scale of the challenges brought to the Regulations makes it a worthwhile one. The range of arguments raised by the tobacco company claimants was exceptionally wide (involving, for example, the law of evidence, domestic and European constitutional law, human rights law, European and international intellectual property rules and the rules of the internal market) and it is hoped that this exploration of the industry's attempt to derail standardised packaging legislation may prove valuable and instructive well beyond the borders of the United Kingdom. Under the Directive, specified text and image health warnings must be carried on the outside packaging of tobacco products. Such warnings must cover 65% of the main surfaces of the unit packet of a tobacco product (see Directive 2014/40 of 3 April 2014 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning the manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco and related products, Art 10) Before looking in more detail at British American Tobacco, it is necessary to outline the relevant legislative framework at European and domestic levels. As a member of the European Union, 8 the United Kingdom has enacted tobacco control measures within a framework deriving from Union law. The Tobacco Products Directive (Directive 2014/40/EU) 9 ("TPD2") is designed to implement the Union's obligations under the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control ("FCTC") and to replace and update a previous Directive in the area ("TPD1").
Standardised packaging legislation -the European Union and the United Kingdom framework

10
TPD2 requires the implementation of extensive restrictions on the labelling and packaging of tobacco products.
11
In particular, it increases the percentage of the space on the outer faces of a tobacco pack which must be taken up with health warnings and imposes a series of further prohibitions on different aspects of product presentation and appearance. TPD2 does not oblige member states to introduce a full standardised packaging regime. 12 However, the option to do so at national level is explicitly left open to member states 13 by Art 24(2) of the Directive, which states that: "This Directive shall not affect the right of a Member State to maintain or introduce further requirements, applicable to all products placed on its market, in relation to the standardisation of the packaging of tobacco products, where it is justified on grounds of public health, taking into account the high level of protection of human health achieved through this Directive. Such measures shall be proportionate and may not constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States..." June 2016, the UK Government has commenced the formal process of bringing membership of the EU to an end. At the time of writing, it is not possible to state precisely how this change in Treaty relations will affect the status of EU rules currently forming part of UK law. The Government's current intention is to "domesticate" secondary legislation implementing Directives wherever possible. If this intention is fulfilled, the vast majority of rules deriving from directives in the area of copyright law will be retained in existing form at the time of formal departure from the Union. See Department for Exiting the European Union, Legislating for the United Kingdom's Withdrawal from the European Union, Cm 9446, March 2017. It also places further regulatory controls on the marketing of tobacco products (including e-cigarettes) and introduces a prohibition on the marketing of tobacco products with "characterising flavours" (including menthol cigarettes).
Some member states, including the United Kingdom, have already taken advantage of the option presented by this provision or have indicated that they will do so in future.
14 In (C-547/14), Philip Morris Brands SARL, tobacco companies challenged the legality of Art 24(2).
15
The case originated in judicial review proceedings in the High Court of England & Wales, in which the companies objected to the TPD2 on a variety of grounds (the claim was described as a "kind of general onslaught" by Advocate General Kokott).
16
A number of issues were referred to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. Amongst the claims, the tobacco companies argued that Art 114 TFEU 17 did not provide a suitable legislative basis for Art 24(2) because it envisaged the introduction of more stringent controls on tobacco packaging in some member states and could not, accordingly, be regarded as having an internal market objective. The Court held that Art 24(2) was not to be interpreted as permitting the introduction of further requirements in relation to any aspect of the packaging of tobacco products, including those harmonised under the TPD2. Rather, it was to be interpreted as permitting member states to implement the further standardisation of tobacco product packaging in respect of aspects of packaging which were not harmonised under TPD2. TPD2 was held only partially to harmonise the packaging of tobacco products within the Union and, as a result, it did not preclude member states from introducing more stringent controls on the colour and presentation of packaging in areas that had not been harmonised. Interpreted in that way, Art 24(2) was held to be consistent with Art 114. While partial harmonisation measures do not eliminate all obstacles to trade, they eliminate some and, accordingly, assist in the establishment of the internal market.
18
The Court's confirmation of Art 24(2)'s legality effectively gave the green light to member states contemplating the introduction of standardised packaging legislation. These included the United Kingdom, where the Regulations had already been adopted when Philip Morris was handed down. The legislative process leading to the Regulations had been protracted. regulations might contribute at any time to reducing the risk of harm to, or promoting, the health or welfare of people under the age of 18.
20
Following the coming into force of this provision, the government sought an independent review of the scientific evidence on the effectiveness of standardised packaging legislation from the paediatrician, Sir Cyril Chantler. His report concluded that, in conjunction with existing tobacco control measures, such legislation was "very likely to lead to a modest but important reduction over time on the uptake and prevalence of smoking and thus have a positive impact on public health". 
23
The aims of the Regulations, set out in an accompanying memorandum, are; first, to discourage young people from starting to use tobacco products; secondly, to encourage people to give up using tobacco products; thirdly, to reduce the appeal or attractiveness of tobacco products; fourthly, to reduce the misleading elements of packaging and the potential for packaging to detract from the effectiveness of health warnings and, finally, to alter attitudes, beliefs, intentions and behaviour relating to the reduction in use of tobacco products.
24
The Regulations pursue these goals through a series of stringent controls on the packaging of cigarettes and hand-rolling tobacco. External packaging surfaces must be presented in a specified dull brown colour and internal surfaces must either be white or the same dull brown. 25 With the exception of health warnings and other statutorily prescribed information, the only distinguishing text permitted on the packaging of products covered by the legislation is a brand and variant name. The font and maximum size of this text is specified.
26
Restrictive conditions are imposed on the presentation of cigarettes themselves.
27
Further constraints relating to the required materials, shape and type of packaging for tobacco products are designed to eradicate all other opportunities for product differentiation.
28
These packaging requirements apply to retail packaging only (that is, to packaging intended to be presented for sale to consumers). The Regulations do not restrict promotion of tobacco products at wholesale level and include provisions designed to preserve the existence of the intellectual property rights in the Industry's brand signs, despite the serious controls placed on the use of those signs. Thus, for example, it is provided (i) that trade marks and designs relating to tobacco products may still be registered even though they cannot be applied to tobacco products 31 and (ii) a trade mark proprietor's inability to use a registered trade mark relating to tobacco products as a result of the Regulations will not result in the revocation of that mark.
32
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R on the application of British American Tobacco Limited v The Secretary of State for Health
Unsurprisingly, tobacco companies brought a wide-ranging legal challenge to the Regulations. Indeed, Green J, who heard the judicial review of the Regulations in the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court noted that "no even remotely or marginally arguable stone has been left unturned" by the companies. 33 Ultimately, he upheld the legality of the Regulations against all challenges in a judgment that extended to precisely 1000 paragraphs.
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On appeal, the Court of Appeal occasionally differed from the judge's approach to specific aspects of the challenge but, overall, confirmed his conclusions in the clearest of terms.
British American Tobacco was concerned with the legality of a specific measure in a single state. Nevertheless, it can justifiably be suggested to have broader significance. A number of the arguments advanced by the companies in this case seem likely to be rehearsed elsewhere in one form or another in future. This will be the case, for example, for the claims relating to (i) the treatment of the company's evidence, (ii) the proportionality of standardised packaging legislation, (iii) the alleged interference with the companies' fundamental right of property, (iv) the relationship between standardised packaging legislation and European Union trade mark law and (v) the legislative competence of member states to introduce standardised packaging legislation, with particular reference to the TRIPS Agreement. The UK courts' analysis of, and conclusions on, these subjects will be of interest in other jurisdictions in which the industry has challenged tobacco control measures, or seems likely to do so in future. Each of these important categories of claim is examined further below. However, before considering them each in turn, it is first necessary to pause briefly to note a number of further, less fundamental arguments that were also raised in British American Tobacco. and that the consultation exercise had been a sham, were also held to be without merit. 37 In a further claim related to the legislative basis for the Regulations, the companies argued that the Secretary of State had failed to give adequate weight to the fact that a decision to introduce standardised packaging legislation at national level could only be justified where the "high level of protection of human health" already achieved through the TPD2 was taken into account. The companies argued that such legislation could therefore only be introduced if there was clear evidence that it would achieve a higher level of health protection than that achieved by TPD2. In rejecting this reading of the provision, Green J held that the Secretary of State had taken adequate steps to assess the desirability of standardised packaging controls within a legislative exercise that was "precautionary, predictive and related to public health". 38 The Court of Appeal upheld this conclusion, finding that Art 24(2) did not require a direct comparative exercise based on specific evidence addressing the relative health benefits of TPD2 packaging and standardised packaging.
39
A parallel claim for judicial review was brought by producers of "tipping paper", the paper which encases the filter tips of cigarettes, and was joined to the companies' challenge to the Regulations. The producers argued that the Regulations' restrictions on the presentation of the paper surrounding cigarettes 40 were ultra vires, firstly because they were not permitted under Art 24(2) because they did not relate to "packaging" and, secondly, because they were disproportionate. On the first of these arguments, Green J held (i) that, read purposively, and in the light of the FCTC, tipping paper fell within the definition of "packaging"; (ii) that, in any event, member states were free to introduce extra restrictions on the branding of tobacco products in order to secure the effet utile of the packaging restrictions in the Regulations and (iii) even if those arguments were wrong, the TPD2 was a partial harmonisation measure which did not prevent member states from introducing further public health restrictions on the presentation of tobacco products.
41
On proportionality, the producers argued that there was no evidence that the controls on the presentation of the paper surrounding cigarettes would serve a useful public health purpose. However, Green J considered that in determining that the altered appearance of the tipping paper would have a beneficial impact.
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In a relatively rare instance of substantive disagreement with the judge, the Court of Appeal did not accept that "packaging" could be interpreted as encompassing tipping paper. Nevertheless, it upheld his judgment on the ground that the TPD2 was only a measure of partial harmonisation and that the EU legislature had not intended to prevent member states from standardising the presentation of the paper surrounding cigarettes more generally.
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On proportionality, the Court of Appeal agreed with the Judge's conclusion that there were reasonable grounds for believing that the controls on the presentation of tipping paper would be beneficial to public health.
44
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The challenge to the Secretary of State's treatment of the tobacco companies' evidence
In a claim that has wide potential relevance, the companies argued that the Secretary of State had acted unlawfully in according limited weight to the evidence they had presented against standardised packaging legislation during the consultation processes. Green J found that no such error had been made, stating that:
"…measured against internationally accepted research and evidence standards, [the companies'] evidence, as a generality, was materially below par". 45 Accordingly, to the extent that limited weight had been placed on the companies' evidence, it had been entirely appropriate for the Secretary of State to do so. The judge also held that, even if insufficient weight had been placed on the industry's evidence, there was no reason to believe that such failure had affected the decision making process leading to Parliament's approval of the Regulations.
46
In concluding thus, the judge approved the best practice guidelines on scientific evidence applied by the Secretary of State at the pre-legislative stage. He took into account the FCTC and WHO guidelines on tobacco industry evidence, and critical academic studies of the companies' submissions to the standardised packaging consultation. He also referred to the judgment in the District Court in the District of Columbia in Tobacco-Free Kids Action Fund v Philip Morris USA Inc, in which the industry's systematic failure to provide honest evidence had been exposed. 47 The judge's conclusions on the industry's practices on research and evidence were strongly worded. He noted, for example, that: "Uniquely in this case there is an international consensus from within the WHO and across the world that tobacco companies are set on subverting national health policies antithetical to their financial interests. This is, in part, due to experiences in the US courts and the sharp conflict between public utterances and private analysis. There is in such circumstances a real premium upon full observance with the principles laid down in the [Civil Procedure Rules] (in so far as there is day light) with best and transparent research and publication practices generally. It is in this way that the tobacco companies can persuade a systemically sceptical world that their research is valid and worthy of the great probative weight they claim for it." 48 There were a number of significant ways in which the companies' evidence was held to fall below best scientific practice. It was not peer-reviewed, or based on peer-reviewed material, and it was not transparent, in that it was not benchmarked against the the companies' own internal documents. The evidence, according to the judge, was "virtually devoid of any reference to the internal documents of the tobacco companies themselves". 49 The evidence presented was often unverifiable and ignored the broader literature on the subjects at issue. At an individual level, the Judge was scathing in his criticism of the evidence of some of the witnesses who appeared on behalf of the companies.
50
On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that Green J had been entitled to refer to the FCTC and its Guidelines and to the judgment in Tobacco-Free Kids Action Fund, even though the latter, in particular, had not been extensively canvassed by the parties at the hearing at first instance. The Court of Appeal also held that the judge had not applied different standards to the expert evidence relied on by the Secretary of State from those applied to the companies' experts. Overall, the Court of Appeal held that the judge had not disregarded or marginalised the companies' evidence by applying a "sui generis rule which singles out the tobacco companies for particular and adverse treatment". 51 It was clear that he had reviewed all the expert evidence in the case in the light of best scientific methodological practice. Any doubts about his approach could not undermine his overall conclusions on this issue.
Proportionality
The tobacco companies argued that the Regulations violate the principle of proportionality because (i) they are not suitable and appropriate to meet the objective of improving public health, (ii) they are not "necessary", in that other less onerous measures could have been adopted just as effectively, and (iii) they do not strike a fair balance between the public interest and the interests of the companies ("proportionality stricto sensu "). Proportionality was relevant to a number of the arguments advanced by the companies, including those and incompatibility with the principle of free movement of goods. It was also raised as a free-standing challenge considered in its own right by both Green J and the Court of Appeal. Their findings on this issue lie close to the core of the dispute. Ultimately, it is absolutely clear that the judge and the Court of Appeal were clearly convinced that the Regulations represented an entirely proportionate response to a serious health problem. Nevertheless, the framework within which a UK court is obliged to assess the proportionality of measures within the scope of EU law is complex and it was therefore necessary for both Green J and the Court of Appeal to consider the applicable principles in some detail. The Judgment of the Supreme Court in R (Lumsdon) v Legal Studies Board ("Lumsdon") 53 and that of the Court of Justice in (C-333/14) Scotch Whisky Association v Lord Advocate ("Scotch Whisky") 54 were particularly significant in this respect. In Scotch Whisky, the Court had emphasised that a member state derogating from the freedom of movement of goods in order to protect human life and health was obliged to provide appropriate evidence of the proportionality of the measures adopted. However, member states were not required to prove that "no other conceivable measure could enable the legitimate objective pursued to be attained under the same conditions".
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Any court assessing the proportionality of such a derogation must "examine objectively whether it may reasonably be concluded from the evidence submitted by the member state concerned that the means chosen are appropriate for the attainment of the objectives pursued and whether it is possible to attain those objectives by measures that are less restrictive of the free movement of goods." 56 In doing so, the court was entitled to take account of scientific uncertainty.
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On these foundations, Green J set out a number of principles relevant to the proportionality analysis. He held that the concept of proportionality under the ECHR and the Human Rights Act 1998 was fundamentally the same as that applied in EU law. He also noted that certain factors, such as the "precautionary" nature of a national intervention in an area of scientific uncertainty might provide a "margin of appreciation" for a decision-maker and that the intensity of the court's review was fact and context sensitive. Drawing on Lumsdon, he pointed to a number of factors which could affect the intensity of judicial review for proportionality. These included: "(i) the nature and importance of the "private interest" being derogated or departed from…(ii) the importance of the public interest being prayed in aid to justify the departure from the competing private right; (iii) the need in an EU case to prevent unnecessary barriers to free movement and market integration…; (iv) the extent to which the alleged derogation itself furthered a recognised social policy of the EU…; (v) the extent to which the national measure derogated from free movement in an 52 See discussion below in section 5.
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[2016] 1 WLR 2283. 55 Ibid [55] . 56 Ibid [56] . 57 Ibid [57] . area where the EU had not legislated but where it was said that the derogating measure furthered an important consumer protection policy in the Member State…". 58 Having traced these important basic principles, he considered their application in British American Tobacco itself.
On appropriateness and suitability, the companies argued that the Regulations would not improve public health. They suggested that the evidence from Australia, following the introduction of standardised packaging legislation, supported this contention and claimed that the introduction of the Regulations would lead customers to "downtrade" to lowerpriced products and, as a result, to increase their use of tobacco. Green J did not accept this argument, holding that the Secretary of State's evidence established a prima facie basis for demonstrating the suitability and appropriateness of the Regulations. In this respect, his assessment of the relative merits of the evidence presented by the parties (as discussed above) was significant. He noted that, while it was necessary to consider the factual foundation and reasoning underlying the proportionality of the impugned measure at an appropriate level of detail, a decision-maker such as the Secretary of State benefited from a "relatively broad margin of appreciation" in a case such as this. This margin arose as a result of: "(a) the fact that the Regulations are public health measures where both the precautionary principle applies and where the scientific evidence is predictive and not fully mature or robust; (b) the fact that there exist scheduled reviews at points in time when it can be expected that the evidence will have developed and matured; (c) the fact that the decision maker was Parliament and that the process of promulgation of the Regulations was supervised by the EU Commission; (d) the fact that the adoption of standardised packaging measures is endorsed at the highest level of international consensus; and (e) the fact that this is an area of shared competence between the EU and the Member States in which the Member States must take a high level of protection of health as their starting point." 59 Great importance was to be attached to legislative activity in the spheres of health and consumer protection. Also militating in favour of a broad margin of appreciation were the facts that (i) this was an area where harmonisation is partial; (ii) the decision to introduce the legislation required a complex evaluation involving political, economic or social choices; (iii) the Regulations were passed by affirmative resolution and (iv) the operation of the Regulations was to be reviewed after a period of 5 years.
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The judge's conclusion that the Regulations were appropriate and suitable was challenged on appeal. In particular, the companies challenged the "margin of appreciation" accorded to the Secretary of State. law but concluded nevertheless that any error in the judge's approach had not been determinative because, regardless of any margin of appreciationapplied, he had independently concluded, after careful examination, that the companies' evidence was adequate to establish the suitability and appropriateness of the Regulations. He had not adopted an erroneous "manifest inappropriateness" standard. The companies also disputed Green J's reference to the precautionary principle, suggesting that it should only apply where there is uncertainty as to the existence of a risk. The Court of Appeal held (i) that an assessment of the proportionality of a measure made at first instance should not be reversed unless vitiated by error of law and (ii) that the precautionary principle could extend to situations, such as that at issue in these proceedings, in which it is uncertain whether action against a known public health risk would be effective. In any event, even if the judge had erred in relying on the precautionary principle, this error had not vitiated his judgment because he had had other reasons for deciding that the Secretary of State benefited from a relatively broad margin of appreciation and had, quite independently, reached a prima facie conclusion that the Secretary of State's evidence was sufficient to demonstrate the appropriateness of the Regulations without reference to any margin of appreciation.
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On necessity, the judge held that Parliament acted reasonably in concluding that there was no equally effective, less restrictive, measure that would have met the aims of the Regulations. Relying again on Scotch Whisky and Lumsdon, he stated that the Secretary of State was not required to prove "positively that no other conceivable measure could enable the legitimate objective pursued to be attained under the same conditions" 62 and that, while all the circumstances bearing on the question of necessity were to be taken into account, a reviewing court would be "heavily reliant on the submissions of the parties for an explanation of the factual and policy context." 63 Because it was uncertain whether a margin of appreciation was available to a decision-maker on this issue after Scotch Whisky, Green J applied a test of "objective reasonableness". On this basis, he accepted that Parliament had acted reasonably in concluding that there was no less onerous, but equally effective, alternative to the Regulations. 64 On appeal, the companies argued that this step of the proportionality review had been emptied of all substance by the judge. However, while the Court of Appeal accepted that some aspects of the judge's reasoning on this issue might be open to criticism, his application of the "objective reasonableness" test drawn from Scotch Whisky was correct and, on this basis, he had been entitled to reach the conclusion that the Regulations were necessary. 65 third component under which a court is obliged to balance the rights and interests of the parties (proportionality stricto sensu) in a case such as this. Green J held that it does and that this element of the test was the same as the "fair balance" enquiry conducted by the European Court of Human Rights when it considers situations in which competing rights conflict.
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In applying this test, he noted that tobacco control was a public interest of the first order and that the competing interest of the companies was "profit". These two interests were said to "collide in the most irreconcilable of ways" and the balance between them overwhelmingly favoured the state.
67
The companies' appeal on this point was rejected.
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The fundamental right of property
The companies also challenged the legality of the Regulations on the ground that they violated their property rights, most notably their trade marks, under Art 1, Protocol 1 of the ECHR, Art 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and at common law.
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In essence, they claimed that the restrictions imposed on the use of trade marks relating to tobacco products under the Regulations were tantamount to an expropriation of those marks and, more broadly, of their brands. They argued that such an interference with property rights could only be lawful on payment of compensation. Green J considered Art 1, Protocol 1 of the ECHR first, noting that the companies' intellectual property rights were undoubtedly "possessions" for the purpose of this provision.
70
Having established that the marks were covered by the ECHR's property guarantee, he went on to determine whether the Regulations were to classified as a "deprivation" of the companies' marks or as a less restrictive "control" on their use. This distinction is significant because states have greater leeway in relation to the latter than the former. Indeed, generally, in the Strasbourg jurisprudence, there is an assumption that "deprivation" of possessions is only lawful where compensation is paid. Having considered the relevant case-law in detail, the judge concluded that the Regulations were a control on the use of the companies' marks rather than an expropriation/deprivation. Trade mark law establishes negative rights and, while the Regulations severely curtailed the companies' ability to use their marks, those marks could still be used on communications at a wholesale level (subject to pre-existing controls on tobacco marketing) and enforced against third party infringers. Accordingly, they The companies also sought to argue that there had been an infringement of their right to conduct a business under Art 16. However, it was held that this "heavily circumscribed" right added nothing to the claim based upon the right of property. Having determined the nature of the interference with the companies' possessions, Green J considered whether compensation was necessary. He noted that, under the case-law of the Strasbourg Court, a "fair balance" test was applied. This was the same as the balancing test previously considered in relation to proportionality and, therefore, clearly came out in the Secretary of State's favour. According to the judge, it was important to appreciate the context of the dispute: "The Claimants seek compensation for the loss of the ability to promote a product that is internationally recognised as pernicious and which leads to a health "epidemic". It is as such unlike any other case in which the Courts have granted compensation…The Claimants could not identify a case where compensation had been paid for the suppression or control of a private activity that pursued an end or objective recognised as a public vice."
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Even if the Regulations had been defined as a deprivation of property, rather than as a control on use, compensation would not have been payable. Under the Strasbourg case-law, compensation generally had to be paid for deprivations of property unless "exceptional circumstances" prevailed. Green J believed that such circumstances existed here: "The reason why there is no breach of A1P1 if compensation is not paid is due to (a) the undeniable and all pervasive harm caused by the product; (b) the fact that the trade marks are used causally to further that harm by promoting the product to consumers; and (c) the fact that they thereby impose on the State clear up and remedial costs of a staggeringly large scale…It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the suppression of rights which promote a health epidemic and impose huge costs on the taxpayer is precisely the sort of circumstance where exceptionality does apply. 73 The Court of Appeal upheld his conclusion on this point.
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The rights under the EU's Charter of Fundamental Rights are closely aligned with those under the ECHR. Nevertheless, the companies argued that, even if there was no violation of Art 1, Protocol 1, there could still be a breach of Art 17 of the Charter because Art 17 encompassed an absolute prohibition on interferences with the right of property which fail to respect the "essence" of that right. On this basis, even if the Regulations were held to be proportionate, they would still fall foul of Art 17. The judge held that this interpretation of the requirements of the Charter would lead to absurd outcomes and could not be Nevertheless, because the issue was not completely free from doubt, he considered the companies' claim on the assumption that Art 17 did, in fact, encompass such an absolute prohibition on the impairment of the "essence" of protected rights. On this basis, he held that the Regulations did not impair the "essence" of the companies' trade mark rights because those trade mark rights primarily provided a cause of action against infringing third parties.
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Green J's strong overall conclusion on this issue is worth quoting at length:
At base this point boils down to the correctness of the [companies'] proposition that the essence or substance of their trade marks allows them to facilitate a health epidemic…and that since they are prevented from using their property rights to do this by the Regulations those measures are unlawful, even if they are otherwise proportionate. In my judgment this is an unsustainable proposition. Nothing in international or EU law could or would tolerate this proposition; it runs counter to almost every sensible notion of how and why fundamental rights are to be defined and it assumes that the tobacco companies' shareholders have a greater hold on fundamental rights than do (say) the 600 children a day who start smoking in the UK and whose long term health prospects and life expectancy are threatened by the [companies'] product and who can also assert a (fundamental) right to protection of their health. In short and even assuming that nothing can impair the essence of a fundamental right, the very concept of "the essence" is flexible and it responds to and is governed by overriding public interest considerations. In the present case the fact that the Regulations intrude upon trade mark usage is simply a reflection of the fact that the essence of the rights yields to and is defined by superior health interests; the essence of the right is not impaired or disrespected as a result. 77 The Court of Appeal upheld this conclusion on Art 17, holding that the essence of the companies' rights was the ability to employ their trade marks as negative rights against third parties and that those rights were retained under the Regulations. Furthermore, the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice clearly demonstrated that the right of property under the Charter is not absolute but can be regulated so far as is necessary in the general interest and is to be viewed in relation to its social function. The various rights protected under the Charter sometimes come into conflict and the resolution of such conflicts inevitably involves an analysis of proportionality. However, this would be impossible if the companies' claim that the essence of a right could not be interfered with in any circumstances were to be upheld. This consequence underlined the absurdity of the companies' submission on this point.
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It was also argued that, at common law, the property in trade marks could not be interfered with without the clearly expressed will of Parliament and, even then, only if compensation 75 
British American Tobacco (UK) Limited) v The Secretary of State for Health [2016] EWHC
were paid. Green J held that Parliament had not ousted the right of property at common law in adopting the Regulations because there was no clear wording to that effect in the legislation. However, he held that a common law right of property must inevitably contain similar limitations to those included in Art 1, Protocol 1 and Art 17. As a result, the common law right neither prohibited the Regulations nor required the payment of compensation.
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On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld this conclusion but employed slightly different reasoning in reaching it, holding that the right of property at common law applied to deprivations of property only and not to controls on the use of property such as that at issue in these proceedings.
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6
Incompatibility with European Union intellectual property rights
